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Most developing countries face important challenges regarding both the quality and quantity 
of health care they provide and there is a growing consensus that health workers play an 
important role in this. Although contemporary analysis of development emphasizes the central 
role of institutions,surprisingly little work looks at how institutions matter for health workers 
and health care delivery, which is the focus of this paper.  One reason for the scarcity of work 
in this field is that it is unclear what the relevant theory is in this area.  We carry out a formal 
exploratory analysis to identify both the problems and the institutional factors that offer an 
explanation.  Using qualitative research on Rwanda, a country where health care problems are 
typical but where the institutional environment is dynamic enough to embody changes, we 
find that four institutional factors explain health worker performance and career choice. 
Ranked in order of ease of malleability they are: incentives, monitoring arrangements, 
professional norms and health workers’ intrinsic motivation.  We discuss their role and the 
implications for future research.  
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1. Introduction 
Many developing countries face serious problems regarding the quality of health care. There 
is an increasing consensus that many of these problems have to do with both the performance 
and career choices of health workers, as they form the foundation for health service delivery 
and issues like poor attitudes towards patients, absenteeism, corruption and embezzlement 
have been well documented for a number of countries.
3    But although recent work on 
development emphasizes the central role of institutions
4, surprisingly little work looks at 
institutions for health service delivery, which is the focus of this paper.   
At least one reason for the scarcity of work on this is that it is unclear what the relevant theory 
is in this area.  Under these circumstances, it is useful to start with careful exploratory 
analysis, as suggested by Mookherjee (2004)
5, to identify the problems and to characterize the 
institutional factors that offer explanations; it may also serve as a base for the future 
formulation of theory and hypotheses.   
We use qualitative research, which has been successfully applied for this purpose in medical 
and anthropological research
6 and focus on one country, Rwanda, where health care problems 
are typical but where the institutional environment is dynamic enough to identify changes.  To 
                                                
3 See for example Olivier de Sardan and Yaffré (2003) who provide elaborate evidence for urban areas in much 
of Francophone Africa; McPake et al (1999) who provides evidence on coping strategies; Ferrinho et al 1998 
who illustrates dual practice; Belli et al (2004) on informal charging and corruption; Franco et al (2004) on 
motivation, and Lindelow and Serneels (2005) on performance problems of health workers in Ethiopia more 
general.  There is also quantitative evidence, for example Chaudhurry et al (2006) on absenteeism.  
4 For a more elaborate treatment of institutions, see Hodgson (1998), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005).  
In this paper we broaden the definition of contracts by also taking into account implicit contracts (norms) and 
internalized norms.  The fourth factor has more to do with market design.   
5 As argued by Banerjee et al. (2005), exploratory research is often not formalized in economic analysis but has 
an important role to play as it typically is the first stage, followed by the formulation of theory and hypothesis, 
and their empirical testing.  Such exploration becomes even more important in areas where it is not clear what 
the relevant theory is, ‘as is the case in most areas of economics’ according to  Mookherjee (See Mookherjee 
2004, p7.) 
6 In practice, exploratory analysis in economics is typically quantitative in nature, adhering to the bias of the 
economics discipline towards quantitative research. As an illustration we carried out a search on the term 
“qualitative research” in two high ranked economic journals that specialize in overview articles: the Journal of 
Economic Literature (JEL) and the Journal of Economic Perspectives (JEP) and find that neither of the two has 
published a paper that uses this term (in title, abstract or body of text) over the last ten years, having issued 
around 960 and 760 papers respectively over the same period.  Although other more specific terms may be used, 
this is a strong indication that, although there is some very good qualitative work (see for example Bewley 
1999), the methodology seems to receive limited recognition within the economic literature. 3
that end we conduct semi-structured group discussions with health workers and users of 
health services in both rural and urban areas.  
The discussions underline, first of all, that health workers make conscious, albeit constrained, 
choices about where, when, and how to work.
7 It also reveals that these choices mostly 
depend on four institutional factors: extrinsic incentives, monitoring arrangements, norms, 
and how to attend to intrinsic motivation.  All four factors affect both the performance and 
career choice of health workers.
8  In what follows we briefly discuss each factor in turn. 
Our analysis suggests that extrinsic incentives - the traditional focus of economics - are 
important, but that health workers take a much broader set of incentives into account than the 
ones that are usually considered. Apart from salaries and financial benefits - like free housing, 
free access to health care for their family, etc. – they also consider less tangible job attributes 
like access to training, chances of promotion, opportunities for holding a second job, etc., and 
more general factors, like whether the location of the job comes with access to good schools 
for their children and access to general infrastructure like electricity, water, quality housing, 
food markets, roads and transport, etc.  Incentives in a more general sense seem to be 
important to help explain health workers’ career choice and performance, probably more so 
than existing empirical research - which typically focuses on earnings in narrow sense, 
indicates. 
9   
A second factor is about the arrangements regarding monitoring and accountability, which 
often tend to be weak.  Sanctioning, for example, is usually absent or lacks credibility.   
However, given the wide range of tasks in which a health worker is typically involved. The 
need for monitoring is high, but the very nature of the work makes monitoring a challenge at 
                                                
7 Although this may seem obvious, it is in contrast with most work on human resources in the health sector, 
which typically views health workers are passive actors and assumes that they have uniform preferences. 
8 We distinguish these two groups of decisions: those related to the level of performance and those related to 
career choices. The former have to do with how many hours to work, to remain absent from work or not (for 
example in order to carry out a second job), what quality of health care to provide, whether to engage in 
inappropriate activities such as pilfering drugs and informal health care, etc.  Career choices have to do with the 
type of job, sector and location to work in: the choice between working in the public, private-for-profit or faith-
based sector, between working in an urban or a rural setting, between clinical care and public health, whether to 
move abroad and even whether to stay in the health sector or not.  The quality of health care provided by health 
workers are determined by both performance and career related choices. The latter affects the former since a job 
that matches better with the health worker’s preferences typically leads to better performance.   
9 Existing research suggests that earnings in a narrow sense has limited effect on performance (see for example 
Van Rijkeghem and Weder (2001), Barr et al (2004)).4
the same time, calling for more innovative approaches, like performance pay and community 
monitoring.
10  
This brings us to a third factor, namely norms.  The discussions suggest that health workers 
who are surrounded by a culture of poor performance, for example those in the public sector, 
are more likely to also perform poorly, while those working in a place encouraging 
performance - for example in the faith based sector - perform much better while receiving the 
same salary.  That norms directly affect a worker’s performance and career choice confirms 
both existing theory and evidence, suggesting that workers internalize norms over time – be it 
at the level of the work place culture, the profession or society at large – to guide their own 
behaviour (Deci 1975).
 11
A final factor is the role of intrinsic motivation, or the inclination to provide medical care for 
its own sake - without taking into account external incentives like earnings or social status.  
Health workers as well as patients talk about the importance of ‘vocation’, and how 
‘commitment’ may be different across sectors.  It underlines the importance of intrinsic 
motivation for both performance and career choice, as suggested by theory
12, and calls for an 
analysis of how institutions take differences in intrinsic motivation into account.
13     
In the next section we describe the data and methodology, while Section three discusses the 
performance problems of health workers and the wider context in Rwanda.  Section four 
discusses the institutional factors, while Section five considers two institutional innovations; 
Section six concludes. 
                                                
10 The need for monitoring is usually considered in a principal-agent framework, stemming from information 
asymmetries between employee and employer.  
11 Bartel et al (2003) for example show in their study of a US bank that differences in norms and attitudes in 
different braches have a direct effect on performance. Barr and Serneels (2008) show that workplace norms are 
related to firm performance among Ghanaian Manufacturing firms.  Bowles (2001) discusses how norms also 
affect career preferences. 
12 See for example Deci (1975), Krepps (1997), Benabou and Tirole (2003). Intrinsic motivation is usually seen 
as an individual characteristic that is a long term product of both nature and nurture, and that cannot be changed 
in the short term.  
13 One example is the allocation of health workers to rural jobs: do those who want to work in rural areas, get a 
chance to do so? 5
2. Method
Qualitative research offers an appropriate tool for exploratory analysis. Group discussions in 
particular are useful as they reveal and contrast a multitude of perceptions and opinions, and 
have been used with success in both medical and market research. The factors described 
above emerged from analysing the qualitative data we obtained from semi-structured group 
discussions with health workers and users of health services in Rwanda.  Following a strict 
methodology in the preparation, implementation and analysis of the discussions, we heard the 
opinions of 73 individuals, 48 health workers and 25 users of health services.  In order to have 
an open discussion we held six separate group discussions with different levels of health 
workers - doctors, nurses and auxiliary health workers, half of them in an urban area, the other 
half in a rural town; and three group discussions with users: one in an urban area, one in a 
provincial town, and one separate discussion with Persons Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA).  
To allow for a richer exploration we tried to maximize within-group heterogeneity by 
selecting the participants using a number of criteria that affect performance and career choice, 
like age, gender, having children or not, the sector of activity (private for profit, private not-
for-profit, public), the type of facility (hospital, clinic, health post), having multiple jobs or 
not, and working at a facility with a performance initiative.
14  Table 1 presents the set up of 
the groups and the profile of the participants. 
                                                
14 We also took into account technical criteria to facilitate group dynamics (like selecting participants who are 
not shy and who do not knowing any of the other group members). Some challenges arose with identifying 
health workers employed in rural private facilities – which are very scarce- and female doctors working in rural 
areas.  6
Table 1: Discussion Groups and Participants 




Total Percent  of 
total 
    
Focus groups  5  4  9  100.0%
Auxiliary nurses (A3 & A4)  1  1  2  22% 
Nurses (A1 & A2)  1  1  2  22% 
Doctors (A0)  1  1  2  22% 
Health users  1  1  2  22% 
Persons living with HIV and AIDS  1  0  1  11% 
    
Health workers  24  24  48  100.0%
of which: Auxiliary nurses   8  8  16  33% 
 Nurses  8  8  16  33% 
 Doctors  8  8  16  33% 
    
 Female  17  8  25  52% 
 With  children  22  19  41  85% 
  below age thirty-six  15  10  25  52% 
    
 Public  18  20  38  79% 
  Private for profit  13  2  15  31% 
 NGO  1  2  3  6% 
    
  has formal second job  3  2  5  10% 
  with performance initiative  11  16  27  56% 
    
Users 17  8  25  100.0%
of which: Persons living with HIV/AIDS  9  0  9  36.0% 
 Other  patients/users  8  8  16  56.0% 
    
 Female  10  3  13  52.0% 
 With  children  17  8  25  100.0% 
    
  last visit in health centre  7  7  14  56.0% 
  last visit in hospital  10  1  11  44.0% 
  last visit in public sector facility  13  5  18  72.0%
  last visit in private for profit sector facility  2  0  2  8.0% 
  last visit in NGO/faith based facility  2  3  5  20.0%
    
The study was implemented in November 2005 and the discussions took place in a meeting 
room in a health facility
15, were semi-structured using detailed scripts, lasted on average two 
hours and a half, and were held in French for the doctors, nurses and pharmacists and in 
Kinyarwanda for the auxiliary health workers and the users. All discussions were recorded 
and transcribed in French.  
The transcripts were then coded, which means that a label was attributed to each unit of text 
or quotation, reflecting the underlying content of the topic discussed.
16 A quotation can be 
given different codes when it refers to different topics at the same time.  Where this occurs, 
the association of codes can be analysed.  In total 1,203 quotes have been examined and 35 
                                                
15 Except for the discussion with PLWHA, which took place at the headquarters of the Rwanda Network of 
PLWHA 
16 This is a coherent entity of text varying from one sentence to a number of sentences.  7
codes have been used, reflecting the diversity of the issues of interest in the study.  The quotes 
reported in this paper are selected because of their salience and because they reflect themes 
and issues recurrently brought up by participants. The text was analysed with QSR NVIVO 
2.0, which also allows for a limited quantitative analysis relating to the associations between 
quotations, which we include in the text.
17  
3.  Health Service Delivery in Rwanda: Context and Challenges 
Despite substantial economic growth and significant financial resources allocated to the health 
sector, Rwanda’s health outcomes remain poor.
18  Major health indicators including infant, 
child and maternal mortality as well as life expectancy at birth remain below the Sub-Sahara 
African average (WHO, 2006).  The Government of Rwanda has done major efforts to rebuild 
the health system since the 1994 war, and this has resulted in important improvements in 
health infrastructure.  Nevertheless, the utilization of health services remains low at 38%, with 
a declining trend in utilisation between 1997 and 2003 (Ministry of Health, 2005).  This low 
utilization occurs despite a high population density - a stark contrast with most Sub-Sahara 
African countries - and a traditionally mixed public private health sector, which could both 
work in favour of utilization.
19  Analysts agree that human resources for health form the main 
explanation for this poor performance and are a key constraint for better health service 
delivery in Rwanda. 
What are the problems with human resources for health in Rwanda? As for many other Sub-
Sahara African countries, the challenges can be divided into those related to the size and 
distribution of the workforce, and those related to health workers’ on-the-job performance.   
With respect to workforce size, Rwanda has a low health worker to population ratio, even by 
Sub-Sahara African standards: for eight out of nine staff categories Rwanda scores below the 
                                                
17 Since the discussions followed a preset script, we can compare the number of quotes for a topic.  A large 
number of quotations is seen as suggestive of the relative importance of that topic to health workers. A low 
number of quotations corresponds to the situation where the interviewer has prompted health workers about a 
topic but gets very few replies because the topic is not an issue.
18 Economic growth has been 7% per year since 1996 (IMF, 2008) and public resource allocated to health 
reached 12% of the national budget in 2004 (WHO, 2008). 
19 The health sector in Rwanda has been characterized by a mix of public and private sector for most of its recent 
history.  However, while in the past not-for-profit and faith based organizations dominated the private sector, for-
profit health facilities are increasingly put in place, especially in the capital.  The not-for profit sector has also 
undergone change in recent years due the increased presence of donor funded public health programmes, such as 
the Global Fund, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, etc. 8
regional average.
20 Community health workers are the only exception, as Rwanda has 
comparatively more of them.
21   
While health workers who participated in the discussions recognize this picture, they also 
point at shortcomings in human resource practices and education policies that exacerbate the 
situation.  Facilities that have been mandated to recruit staff directly often seem to lack the 
resources to do so.  As a consequence especially junior nurses often have to wait before they 
can take up their first job.  On the education side it is a mystery to most health workers why 
there is still a numerous clausus for medical students, while the limited access to secondary 
education in general restricts the number of students who can enrol for either nursing or 
medical studies.  
Since health workers can choose where to work, the least popular positions tend to be 
understaffed.  This is especially the case for higher educated health workers who are more 
scarce and can therefore be more picky about their place of work.  A good example is the 
shortage of health workers in rural areas.  In 2006 only 17% of health workers in the public 
sector took up a job in a rural area (Ministry of Health, 2006).  When health workers in our 
research talk about frustration and dissatisfaction in the profession, they frequently relate this 
to rural postings (in 15% of the cases).  Private sector positions are often more popular than 
public sector ones, while jobs in public health seem to be more popular than those in clinical 
care, because they are often better paid, but also because they involve no health risks.  Still, 
when a job compensates for this kind of risks, it manages to attract health workers.
22  Our 
research suggests that higher earnings definitely contribute to the higher popularity of private 
sector jobs: when health workers talk about high pay, in 15 out of the 17 cases they refer to 
the private sector, for-profit or NGO’s, and often mention HIV/AIDS services.  
                                                
20 It has less than one fourth physicians per 1000 inhabitants compared to Sub-Sahara Africa as a whole, less than 
one half nurses and midwives, less that a sixteenth dentists and technicians, about half the pharmacists and 
technicians,etc. (WHO 2006). Although the differences may to some extent be justified by the fact that 
population density is much higher and as a consequence less health workers per population are needed, this does 
not justify the large difference, as the figures remain very low to equally populated areas elsewhere.  Rwanda 
does, however, have three times as much community health workers per 1000 inhabitants. 
21 To address these shortages, the Ministry of Health has set up staffing norms for each type of facility. Actual 
staff numbers remain far below these targets with less than 30% filled (Ministry of Health, 2006).
22 An illustration is the premium many NGO’s pay to physicians involved in HIV/AIDS medical services, paying 
6 times as much as the public sector for similar services (MMinistry of Health, 2006). 9
While shortages in some positions - for instance in rural areas - are a fact, they should not be 
taken as a fait accompli.  Job attributes, including earnings, can be changed in order to make 
these positions more attractive. It is also important to bear in mind that health worker 
preferences are heterogeneous, with some health workers choosing to provide health care 
where it is needed most, and that preferences can be moulded to some extent as we will 
discuss later. 
Box 1: Unbalanced allocation of Health Workers
Rural areas are intolerable; life is difficult. If you want your child to grow, you cannot accept to work in a rural 
are. When you go there, you will plunge yourself in a routine, will not be able to increase your living standard, 
and you eventually become a peasant.                           Auxiliary worker in Kigali
It is Siberia!                             Doctor in Kigali 
In a rural area, a doctor kills himself. He looses all elements that make up a real doctor, and will end up with 
25% of what he knew                                    A doctor in a rural district 
Nurses working in the rural areas are not satisfied and insult the patients; while doctors working in the rural 
areas become bitter to the point they don’t take hitchhiking patients, and all that because they’re stuck in the 
r u r a l   a r e a s .            User in Kigali 
(…) there’s no plan of development for a doctor working in the rural areas; once you’re affected to the rural 
areas, it’s as if you’re lost in the rural areas. The lack of this career development for the doctor in a rural area 
means that once you’re affected or mutated, it’s like a punishment.                                     Doctor in a rural 
district 
Apart from shortages in some types of posts, a second type of problem is health workers’ on-
the-job performance.  In the discussions, health workers themselves as well as the users of 
health services identified a number of problems, which can be summarized in four categories.  
Firstly, many health workers have poor attitudes towards patients and seem to have weak 
patient management skills. They are frequently impolite and rude, favour some patients above 
others and often care little about the long waiting times for patients. The importance of this 
issue for users is underlined by the fact that 61% of the quotes from users are about the 
reception of patients and health worker attitudes.  Absenteeism among health workers is a 
second problem. Many health workers stay absent from work during parts of the day, or 
sometimes the entire day, and this appears to be mostly related to a second job and 
particularly high among health workers in urban areas and doctors.  About 40% of the quotes 
on absenteeism (26) refer to doctors, underlining that they can organise their own time 
schedule freely.  A third problem is the presence of corruption and embezzlement among 
health workers. Corruption varies from asking bribes to helping patients jump the queue or 
escape high bills, to asking extra payment for services outside working hours, or in some 10
cases falsification of documents.  Sometimes monetary gifts are perceived as a token of 
gratitude.  Embezzlement of drugs and materials also occurs, as materials are taken away from 
the facility to be used in the provision of informal care, while drugs are often sold on in the 
market.  We collected 73 quotes on inappropriate behaviour, indicating that it is firmly 
present. Interestingly, examples almost exclusively refer to unorganized and petty corruption.  
A final problem is the lack of medical skills among health workers, especially among nurses 
and auxiliary health workers, who are themselves concerned about their own lack of 
knowledge, for instance in how to deal with HIV/AIDS. The latter is confirmed by people 
living with HIV/AIDS, who complain about the lack of knowledge among health staff. 
All four types of performance problems turn out to be far more important in the public than in 
the private and faith-based sector. Patients emphasize that health worker attitudes are better in 
private-for-profit and faith-based facilities; health workers point out that absenteeism, 
corruption and embezzlement are lower in the private sector.  Both patients and health 
workers suggest that this has to do with the higher pay, the superior monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms, and the difference in work culture in the private sector, while 
health workers in faith-based facilities are moreover perceived to be more committed.  But the 
respondents suggest that the situation in public facilities is improving with both absenteeism 
and embezzlement of drugs apparently falling.  The implementation of performance related 
premiums, the training of health workers on quality assurance and the increased monitoring of 
health workers by community representatives are perceived as playing an important role in 
this and this. 
Although our research focuses on Rwanda, all the problems we identify seem to arise in other 
countries.  Explorative research for Ethiopia similar to ours identifies very similar problems, 
while Olivier de Sardan and Yaffre (2003) find similar problems for most capital cities in 
Francophone West Africa. 
23
                                                
23 see Lindelow and Serneels (2007) and Olivier de Sardan and Yaffre (2003) respectively. 11
Box 2: Performance Problems among Health Workers
Poor Attitudes 
To receive the patients well, you need sufficient and capable personnel. The faith-based sector has enough 
personnel and equipment, but the public health centre often lacks personnel and equipment. Therefore people 
don’t like to go to public health centres.               User in a rural district 
Health workers in the public sector may receive patients badly because they know there are no consequences, 
but in the private sector the employer is usually around and observes how things are done.   
                            Auxiliary health worker in Kigali 
.. and if you dare saying you feel bad, they react angrily which makes you even sicker.    User in Kigali 
There was a mother who took her ill baby to the hospital asking for drugs and the nurse said ‘Go away, when 
your baby dies, I will deliver another one for you’; the nurse is still working at the hospital; unfortunately the 
baby is dead.                             User in Kigali 
Health workers [in the public sector] insult patients who are for example dirty.    Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
Absenteeism and shirking  
Doctors are more absent in the public sector than in the private sector.                Doctor in a rural district 
To some of the remote health centres, you can go and find no one to receive you.     User in a rural district 
When the State has prevented you to take up another job, for example with an NGO. Then, you just act as if you 
work.                                                  Doctor in Kigali 
Many health workers pretend to work.                            Doctor in Kigali 
Corruption and Embezzlement 
Patients paid more than was reported in the register, we’ve found many of those cases.  
Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
There may for example be an agreement between the patient and the nurse: the patient leaves at night and in the 
morning it is observed that the patient left without paying. In fact he has given money to a nurse. 
Doctor in Kigali 
Some doctors sign medico-legal documents making things up.                           Nurse in Kigali 
The theft of small material is really very frequent but you can never know who did it.   Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
We had a case where nurses embezzled drugs, sold them, took the money of the community and used it for their 
proper consumption.                                    Doctor in a rural district 
The embezzlement of drugs had become important but now we require that when leaving the office you show the 
next person what is not there.                     Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
Lack of technical Skills
There are health centres headed by an auxiliary health worker; this leads to problems regarding the quality of 
care.                                    Doctor in Kigali 
In our health centre there’s only one A2 nurse. When she leaves for training, I remain alone and do everything 
without being properly educated. I do it but it really is a problem             Auxiliary worker in a rural district 
Our knowledge is not sufficient.  The training that is administered does not arrive at our level.   
                           Auxiliary worker in a rural district 12
4. How Institutions Explain Health Worker Behaviour
Four institutional factors emerge from the discussions that, through their effect on health 
worker performance and career choice, have a determining influence on the quality of care 
provided: incentives, monitoring and accountability, norms and work place culture, and 
intrinsic motivation.  We discuss each in turn.  
4.1  The Role of Incentives 
Classic economics argues that people who are paid more, perform better.  But there is no 
consensus why this is the case, as the relationship can go both ways.  Workers may be 
performing better because they are paid more, or they may be receiving higher payment 
because they perform better.  In a public sector context, where rewards are heavily regulated, 
the question then becomes whether the existing rewards are sufficient to either make health 
workers perform well or to attract workers who perform well.  There is limited empirical 
evidence on the relationship between payment and performance in the health sector.  A small 
literature looks at the effect of earnings on corrupt behaviour, and suggests that the effects of 
earnings in a narrow sense are small. Barr et al. (2003), for example, using a behavioural 
experiment, find that earnings reduce embezzlement, but that the effect is limited, while Van 
Rijkeghem and Weder (2001), using cross-country data, find that higher public servant 
salaries (relative to manufacturing wages) are associated with less corruption, but neither 
Treisman (2000) nor Rauch and Evans (2000) have been able to replicate the result. They do 
find suggestive evidence, however, that employment security and recruitment and promotion 
have a more important effect on corruption, suggesting that job attributes in a more general 
sense have a larger effect on performance.  Similar evidence emerges from another strand of 
the literature, such as the - mostly exploratory - work on absenteeism among health workers. 
Chaudhury et al (2006) find for example that absenteeism is lower when facility conditions 
are better, while Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo (2004) find that it is highly correlated with the 
cost of getting to work.   
Incentives and rewards also affect health workers’ career choices, as they determine how 
attractive a position is. As argued by the theory of compensating wage differentials, jobs with 
less attractive attributes typically offer higher wages in order to attract workers.  Serneels et 13
al. (2007), using contingent valuation, determine what wage premium is needed to make 
health workers in Ethiopia take up a rural post. They find that, to get 80% of health workers 
take up a rural position, public sector salaries for nurses and doctors need to increase with 
57% and 83% respectively, suggesting that small changes in salaries will have a limited effect 
on the distribution of health workers. 
Our research confirms that incentives and rewards affect health worker performance and 
career choice, but especially when interpreted in a broad sense.  Apart from earnings, which 
include the health worker’s salary and his compensation for over-time, other financial benefits 
like the health worker’s pension, the per diem he receives for field work or training, and the 
reimbursement of health care costs for his family members, are also important.  Non-financial 
benefits, like access to training, and other contractual stipulations, like job security, are also 
recognised as important job attributes.  Finally, indirect factors that are associated with the 
place of work, like access to quality housing and infrastructure, including good education for 
their children, and access to other income opportunities, like a second job, also play an 
important role.
24  
The importance of earnings is underlined by the fact that insufficient reward is the single most 
important source of frustration among health workers with 25% of the quotes about low 
satisfaction referring to low remuneration.  Especially lower level health workers indicate that 
their earnings are not sufficient to satisfy the basic need of family life.  Because earnings are 
modest, health workers often engage in secondary activities. This has an effect on their 
performance, and health workers argue that they would perform better if they would get a 
higher salary.  The rewards associated with a job certainly contribute to explaining health 
workers’ job preferences.  Posts in rural areas, for example, come with lower access to 
infrastructure and good schools, lower availability of secondary activities, and lower access to 
alternative employment opportunities; they also have a cost of personal and professional 
isolation attached to them and may limit future career opportunities.
25 Doctors, for instance, 
have almost no incentive to work in rural areas since they earn more, can specialise, and enjoy 
a higher quality of life – both professional and personal - in urban areas.  Because of this large 
                                                
24 Serneels et al. (2007) provide quantitative evidence that especially access to education for children, access to 
training and promotion for the health worker himself are key factors in the choice between a rural and urban 
post.  
25 Because the quality of care in rural facilities is typically basic, working in a rural post is historically seen as a 
signal of low skills.  Not-for-profit facilities and NGOs often value rural experience. 14
difference between urban and rural areas, remoteness benefits, which typically represent only 
a small percentage of the salary, will have a limited effect, although they may convince some 
health workers.  A more detailed quantitative analysis is needed to find out what premium is 
needed.   
Differences in rewards also help to explain the choice between sectors, but again, only to 
some extent.  Although many health workers prefer to work for the private for-profit sector, 
which pays the highest wages, some prefer to work for the public sector because it offers 
higher job security, access to training, and access to medical care at a reduced cost.  Still 
others prefer to work for the faith based sector, which follows the public sector salary scales 
but also provides additional financial benefits, and usually provides on the job training.  Thus, 
salaries by themselves seem to have some but not enough power to attract health workers to 
certain positions.  
Box 3: The Importance of Incentives for Health Worker Performance and Career Choice
Earnings  
Doctors’ salaries should be increased in order that, when he goes to work he does not go to work for just some 
hours and then goes elsewhere to earn more.                        User  in  Kigali 
If we want a doctor to deliver a good service, he needs to have a good salary, to live, to ensure his family can 
live, and to ensure that when he treats 10 patients, they are treated well.       Person  living  with 
HIV/AIDS 
If our salary were increased, we would work better and, moreover, be extremely happy while at work. 
                           Auxiliary worker in a rural district 
We have friends - lawyers, economists, and others - and when we talk to them, we hear what they earn, and find 
that they earn much and work little.                            Doctor in a rural district 
In the private sector or in an NGO, one earns a lot of money.                           Nurse in Kigali 
Public health pays best. They are paid but do not have to work.                          Doctor in Kigali 
Other attributes 
There is the training, medical care, annual salary increase. The most important advantage of the public sector is 
the access to low cost medical care; we only pay 15% of the bill, even of the drugs.               Nurse in Kigali 
Stability 
What’s important is the job stability. In the public sector one has more security even if one is not paid as good as 
in the other sectors.                                   Nurse in Kigali 
It’s true we’ve been talking about salary and other problems in the public sector, but it’s not like with those 
Americans [who are investing in public health by starting new NGOs] who are here for a set period only and 
will leave afterwards, so they can chase you out any time. Then it’s better to earn a small but regular sum of 
money.                                    Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
In private health centres, one never signs a contract. You just draw up a convention and when it’s necessary, the 
employer fires you, but as long as you work well, he keeps you.             Auxiliary worker in Kigali 15
Training 
An advantage of the public sector is that one receives training.              Auxiliary worker in a rural district 
If we had the choice between training and salary increase, we’d choose training.                 Nurse in Kigali 
A specialisation is generally obtained in the public sector; it’s far more difficult to specialise in the private 
sector.                                   Doctor in Kigali 
Public-private  
You can’t compare the faith-based sector with the public sector, for example, in certain faith-based hospitals, 
they have specialists coming over and staying for one or two months and then you receive training. 
                                   Doctor in a rural district 
Rural urban  
In the public sector, it is encouraged to work in the rural districts and you receive a premium.      Nurse in Kigali 
It’s necessary to have a second job. Experience shows that almost all doctors in Kigali have a second 
job. In the rural areas, this is not possible because there are no opportunities for a second job.
Doctor in a rural district 
What we would need to be motivated to go to a rural area? A salary increase. Equipment. The possibility for 
further training. Access to education for the children.                  Doctors in a rural district 
Doctors in the rural areas have a particular reputation in the medical corps, they make many mistakes and do 
things in a mediocre way                                            Doctor in Kigali
In the rural areas, a doctor would kill himself You loose all that makes you a real doctor, you end up with 25% 
of what you knew  A doctor in a rural district 
4.2.  Monitoring and Accountability 
Monitoring and accountability form a second factor that affects both performance and career 
choice, and although they are important in any employment, they are especially important in 
health professions. Indeed, since health workers engage in multiple tasks for which the 
outcomes are often difficult to observe, employment contracts are highly incomplete leaving 
plenty of scope for moral hazard.
26  The role of monitoring is attracting growing attention in 
micro-economic analysis and specifically for public servants.
27 Generally speaking, 
monitoring can take different forms: agents can be monitored from above – in our case by 
their superior or a representative (for example a health inspector), from aside – by their 
colleagues and peers, or from below – by their clients or the community they serve.   
Regarding the subject of monitoring, there are two approaches: monitoring can focus on 
                                                
26 See for example Dixit (2001) and Le Grand (2003) for a discussion on these themes for civil servants.  
27 One of the key reasons seems that it helps to explain why contracts are relatively simple in practice, in contrast 
to what theory predicts.  Indeed, the literature on contracts, mostly theoretical in nature, does not seem to fit with 
the empirical observation that in reality most contracts are relatively simple, as argued by Chiappori and Salanie 
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outcomes or on processes.  An important question is how much monitoring is needed.  Too 
little monitoring is ineffective, while too much is inefficient and may negatively affect 
performance as it erodes motivation.  Also important is the sanctioning mechanism.   
Monitoring is likely to have limited effect without credible sanctioning.  Serneels, Lindelow 
and Lievens (2008), studying absenteeism in the health sector in Ethiopia and Rwanda, 
observe that punishment in case of detection is very unlikely, rendering any monitoring 
strategy ineffective.  There is, however, limited detailed empirical evidence on the role of 
monitoring and accountability because one needs institutional variation to study the impact of 
monitoring.  Existing work on the education sector indicates that monitoring can have large 
effects, for example on teacher absenteeism (Duflo et al.,2007) or on the management and 
fund allocation at the school of funds at the school level (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004).  
Evidence from behavioural experiments also suggests that how the monitor is appointed – for 
example whether he is elected by the community or not – has an effect on performance (see 
Barr et al. 2004).   
Health workers and users have much to say about monitoring and accountability with 80 
quotations directly attributed to this theme. They confirm that it is difficult for employers to 
monitor health worker performance and that monitoring and accountability systems can differ 
greatly across sectors and locations; they are weaker in the public than in the private and faith-
based sectors, and less present in remote areas.  Users point out that health workers are not 
sufficiently accountable. Sanctioning for bad performance is unheard of, except for specific 
and extreme cases of recurrent misbehaviour, like drinking and fighting at the workplace, 
according to health workers themselves. Especially doctors are weakly supervised. The annual 
performance evaluation system that is in place in the public sector with the aim of monitoring 
individual behaviour is seldom used, and where it is used, it is perceived as too subjective.  
The current efforts from the Government of Rwanda to attribute a larger role to community 
monitoring and to reduce the need for monitoring by making pay more dependent on 
performance, have created high expectations; we evaluate these new interventions in Section 
5.  17
Box 4: Monitoring and Accountability
There’s no system of supervision in the public sector.                                    Doctor in Kigali
Here in the hospital, a nurse can commit a professional mistake but there is no law that can punish him. 
                            User in Kigali 
In the faith-based sector, health workers are continuously monitored. It’s impossible to have time wasted. 
                               User in a rural district 
In the private sector, you’re sacked even for a minor mistake, but in the public sector you’re sacked only if 
you’re really impossible.                            Auxiliary worker in a rural district 
It also depends on where you work; fraud can occur in public health centres, but in the faith-based or private 
sector it’s far more difficult since the control is much more rigorous.                                Doctor in a rural district 
We have an annual evaluation that should normally be sent to the Ministry of Health, but it is not respected and 
is not being done regularly.                                 Nurse in Kigali 
Performance is evaluated using an evaluation form, but it is of no use because there is a problem of objectivity: 
who evaluates whom and how?                                            Nurse in Kigali 
I give everybody “very good”; it’s subjective because there are no objective criteria.             Doctor in Kigali 
4.3  The Role of Norms 
Norms can generally be seen as an implicit way of monitoring or an implicit contract 
enforcement device (see Fehr et al 1997).  Professional norms are believed to be fundamental 
in constraining opportunistic behaviour among service providers, especially in the health 
sector.
28  For our purpose, we can think of three relevant levels of norms: society wide norms, 
professional (peer group) norms, and workplace norms.  Society-wide norms are relevant 
because one expects that, ceteris paribus, corruption among health workers will be higher if 
there is more corruption in society at large.  Peer group norms are important because they 
determine professional success and recognition; they are guarded by a professional body, like 
the Order of Physicians.  At the level of the work place, norms provide a way of monitoring 
daily behaviour like attitudes towards patients, work ethic and engagement in corrupt 
activities.  
The group discussions focus on norms related to professional and workplace culture.   
Professional norms are typically acquired during professional training, and there are 
                                                
28 See for example Frank (2004), Ferrinho and Van Lerberghe (2000, 2002), Ferrinho et al (1998) and Tendler 
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indications that the strength of norms varies across schools.
29  Work place norms vary 
substantially across sectors.  Private for profit facilities seem to be more client oriented, but 
also more money oriented, have a heavier work load, while health workers in not for profit 
facilities have a reputation for being dedicated.  Public sector facilities have the most damaged 
image, and are perceived as having weak work ethics. Some work place norms have been 
transformed into bylaws, which health workers are expected to follow. With the foundation of 
the Ordre des Médecins in 2001, professional norms are now being evaluated and health 
workers place high hopes in this auto-regulatory body to enforce internal rules and provide 
credible punishment where needed. Nurses have expressed their hopes that they too would 
have an Order soon.  
Box 5: Professional and Workplace Norms
The regulations are clear, if you are working for the government, you are expected to have a certain attitude.  
Doctor in a rural district 
The bylaws consist of a number of rules to follow. If a person does not respect a rule, he is told so and informed 
about the sanction, the first time orally, the second time in writing. If it happens another time, the sanction is 
a p p l i e d .                         Nurse in a rural district 
If you compare the public and the faith-based sector, you’ll find that there are more problems in the public 
sector because the health workers know they cannot be sacked easily.  User in a rural district
I have the impression that there is a system when it really goes very badly, when it is absolutely clear that there 
is a problem, then, something is done, the person is blamed or something else.  Doctor in Kigali 
Since the order of doctors has been created there have been investigations undertaken, and some doctors have 
been suspended.  Doctor in a rural district 
People love to go to the private sector because the health personnel speak kindly. They treat few patients and 
take time to speak at length with them; consequently, when the patients leave the health centre, they are very 
happy.  Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
4.4. Intrinsic Motivation 
As mentioned earlier, intrinsic motivation is the urge to do something for its own sake.  It 
comes about as the internalization of norms over time, but since this is a slow process, 
intrinsic motivation should be considered exogenous in the short run.  Intrinsic motivation 
affects performance in the sense that more motivated health workers tend to perform better.  It 
                                                
29 An alternative way to look at norms obtained at school is to consider them as socialized motivation, as 
described in the next section.  As norms taught during professional education are internalized, they shape 
motivation, which at least in part springs from norm that are internalized over time.  19
can be seen as a self-enforcing contract that leads to a higher performance outcome (Deci, 
1975).
30  A weakness of many existing payment schemes is that they do not take into account 
the heterogeneity in performance due to differences in motivation, an issue that performance 
pay may be able to address. 
Intrinsic motivation also affects career choice as it is highly correlated with career preference.
31  Individuals prefer a job that satisfies their intrinsic motivation.
32 An important question is 
also how candidates are allocated to jobs. In Rwanda matching takes place through a largely 
unregulated market – thus taking into account differences in preferences and intrinsic 
motivation.
33  
Although intrinsic motivation should be considered constant in the short term, it may change 
in the long term.  This may happen for two reasons.  First, new norms may be internalized 
over time. For instance, health workers who happen to work in a corrupt environment for a 
long period of time may revise their norms and ‘get socialized into corruption’.  Second, 
extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation.  Seabright (2002) illustrates how 
satisfaction derived from intrinsic motivation may conflict with that derived from extrinsic 
incentives, explaining why paying for activities that are done out of intrinsic motivation may 
reduce performance. Titmuss (1970) makes a similar point much earlier emphasising the 
importance of altruism in the organization of blood donation. 
34
                                                
30 which is more likely to arise in some environments - such as NGO’s - than in others because these 
environments are better suited to overcome agency problems (see Glaeser, 2001; Pauly, 1987)
31 Serneels et al (2007), using quantitative analysis, finds for example that motivation is a major explanatory 
factor of health worker’s willingness to work in a rural area in Ethiopia, and that motivation is both related to 
exogenous variables (like gender and age) and potentially endogenous variables like having attended an NGO 
school.  
32 Besley (2005) argues that how a system functions already builds in selection criteria.  Applying this to politics, 
he argues that the political system in itself determines who self-selects into politics. 
33 Allocation mechanisms - whether an unregulated market, a regulated market or an alternative allocation 
mechanism like a lottery- have received some attention in high income countries – see for instance Roth and 
Sotomayer (1990) for how the allocation of medical doctors in the US has been redesigned over time- but have 
received very limited attention in developing countries, and there is certainly place for a more active role in the 
design of these institutions. Roth (2008) points at typical problems like thinness and congestion, and argues that 
allocation can be engineered to be more efficient. 
34 The best known example for this is provided by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) who show that when a fine is 
imposed on parents for picking up their children late from Kindergarten, more parents come late. The reason is 
that they do no longer see ‘being late’ as conflicting with their intrinsic motivation, but now see as it as an 
entitlement for which they pay. For other work on the crowding out of intrinsic motivation see also Benabou and 
Tirole (2003). 20
Health workers in Rwanda make generous use of a religious vocabulary when describing their 
motivation to work in the health sector, using words like ‘vocation’, ‘devotion’ and 
‘apostolate’.  They attribute an important role to intrinsic motivation, arguing that one needs 
to have high intrinsic motivation to surmount low pay relative to high effort, poor working 
conditions, the lack of career perspectives and the risk of getting HIV/AIDS.  Some 
participants argue that intrinsic motivation is related to religious beliefs and those working for 
the faith-based sector are said to be ‘more committed’ to their job than others.  In general, the 
discussions indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity in motivation among health 
workers.  Because of the importance of intrinsic motivation, health workers are concerned that 
the performance initiatives, which provide bonuses according to reaching quantifiable 
objectives, may erode commitment because performance is typically measured in terms of 
quantifiable objectives, and may stimulate a more ‘mechanical’ behaviour among health 
workers.  
Since health workers can choose freely where they work in Rwanda, and social relations are 
perceived less important to get a job compared to the past
35, those with high intrinsic 
motivation self-select into positions they like, for instance posts in the faith-based sector or in 
rural areas.  The for-profit sector, which often puts higher demands on health workers and also 
provides higher payment, may attract a different profile of health workers.  The public sector 
seems to attract health workers who plan to continue for further specialization, or those who 
do not find a job in the (for-profit or not-for-profit) private sector.  
                                                
35 Job mobility between the sectors is said to also have increased in recent years.  Recently, the Ministry of 
Health (MOH) tried to reduce the outflow of health workers from the public to the private sector by issuing a 
circular note that should restrain Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) in their aggressive approach to attract 
health workers from the public sector.21
Box 6: Intrinsic Motivation
Some say being a health worker is an apostolate.                           Doctor in a rural district
Whether you want it or not: when you study medicine, you have a vocation. If you do not have this vocation, you 
will fail. A doctor needs to be permanently devoted; a doctor without devotion is not a doctor.     Doctor in Kigali
When you have a vocation it is impossible to do something else.                        Auxiliary worker in a rural district 
There is always this vocation, which pushes you to continue even if conditions are not met: the salary, the 
equipment, the other colleagues, the professional environment; but since lives are threatened, you are pushed to 
continue, the situation is more or less comparable in the public, private or faith-based sector.
Doctor in a rural district 
We always work longer than the planned timetable, it’s a vocation; you cannot leave a patient because it’s time 
to go.                                             Nurse in Kigali 
Health workers in the faith-based sector are more committed to their work compared to those in the public 
sector. 
Auxiliary worker in a rural district 
Today, health workers only seek money.                                                                     Person living with HIV/AIDS 
5. Institutional Innovations for Service Delivery
We focus on three innovations that are being implemented in Rwanda and deserve special 
attention: the gradual implementation of performance pay, the establishment of community 
health committees and the training of health workers in attitudes and patient management 
skills.    
Performance Pay 
In the private for profit sector pay is typically related to performance and workers who 
perform well receive a higher salary.  This has inspired policy makers to establish a similar 
performance related pay system in the public sector.  In 2001 the Government of Rwanda 
started the Initiatives for Performance (IP) in a number of public and faith based facilities. IP 
makes part of the funding that a facility receives dependent on its performance.  An important 
characteristic of IP in Rwanda is that performance is not measured at the individual level, but 
rather at the facility level and it is thus the facility that receives a reward if it performs well. 
The facility itself determines how to distribute the premium among the health workers, so 
there is scope to pay higher wages to better performing health workers; it can also decide to 
use the additional funding for hiring extra personnel.  22
In general, the Initiative for Performance receives a positive evaluation from both health 
workers and users of health services in our discussions. Health workers monitor each other 
more than before and this has improved their performance. IP seems to have had both a 
quantitative and qualitative effect: it seem to have increased the number of vaccinations, pre- 
and postnatal care and curative care consultations (which are all part of the targets); and it also 
has improved the attitudes of health workers towards patients, the quality of care, and the 
teamwork among health workers.  A reported shortage of IP is that it translates mostly into 
extra payment but not into improved career development; hence almost half (14 out of 30) of 
the quotations on performance pay refer to the payment modalities of IP.  Another potential 
down side, according to patients, is that it encourages health workers to implement certain 
activities mechanically, thereby eroding the quality of care.  Thus, although it may induce 
health workers to put more effort in their job, users fear that effort will be directed towards 
certain activities, usually the more profitable.  Measuring performance at the facility rather 
than at the individual level certainly reduces this tendency, by increasing peer monitoring and 
team motivation.  Some health workers are also dissatisfied with the lack of transparency of 
how the premium is distributed within the facility.  Finally, IP has created high expectations 
but cannot address all shortcomings.  Health workers complain that it has not solved the lack 
of equipment and the shortage of technical skills of health workers.  
Box 7: Performance Pay
A health worker knows that if he does not work well, if he is absent, if he is too late, if his service is not 
appreciated, this will decrease the premium that the health centre receives. It makes that personnel controls each 
other. Everybody knows that the one that works badly can be sacked and risks being accused by his colleague; 
this leads to a higher degree of accountability and higher productivity                     User in Kigali 
You’re the only doctor to consult. But with the IP, one recruits, and instead of one doctor, you’re for example 
five. So there’s an improvement in the work conditions and you’re no longer stretched.        Doctor in a rural area
 Now, we see that there’s improvement in the motivation of health workers. Regulations have been developed by 
each health centre and have to be followed. The regulations are such that when they are not followed, part of the 
premium is withdrawn, which makes the personnel more accountable and more responsible. We are more 
conscious of what we have to do. The stability of our personnel is also assured by this premium.   Nurse in Kigali 
Patients are better received, the guards are better organised, but as for quality, technically spoken, there has not 
yet been improvement because there is no technical support, no equipment.               Doctor in Kigali 
In vaccination for example, before the premium we asked ourselves why we had to fetch children that were not 
vaccinated, but since IP, we are obliged to go and search this child that has not been vaccinated because we 
know that this activity is paid for.              Nurse in a rural district 23
There’s inequality in the distribution of the premium, even if we do the same tasks and have the same diploma.
                           Auxiliary worker in Kigali
It is a good initiative, but performance should not just be acknowledged in financial terms, I think people also 
want advancement in their career, they want promotion.                   Doctor in Kigali 
But what often happens is that after a while, there’s the risk of routine, to carry out lots of activities that are not 
necessarily of good quality; something that can make the Initiative for Performance perpetual is a constant 
monitoring system.                           Doctor in a rural district 
Community Health Committees 
As part of a wider move towards decentralization and involving local communities in 
governance, the Government of Rwanda encourages the establishment of Community Health 
Committees.  The idea is that local communities are involved in the management of the health 
centres, in the spirit of the Bamako Initiative.
36  So while performance pay encourages self-
monitoring and sideways monitoring, Community Health Committees increase monitoring 
from below through community health workers who represent the patient population on the 
health centre committees.  One of the risks of this type of decentralization is the capture by 
local elite (Bardhan 2002).  Indeed community members in a privileged position may be able 
to capture these new powers from the community and use them directly for their own benefits, 
for example by employing loyal community members, or to increase their grip on power over 
the community. 
The discussions suggest that the establishment of community health committees address the 
lack of accountability of health workers, especially in rural areas.  By letting community 
representatives having a seat on the health committees, they can use their discretionary power 
to give financial rewards to well-performing health workers and use disciplinary measures to 
badly behaving health workers.  Users argue that the approach has led to an increase in the 
quality of care because health workers performance has improved, mainly because of lower 
absenteeism and improved attitudes towards patients.  Because information on health worker 
behaviour is mostly available at the local level, community health workers seem to close the 
information gap that typically exists between the higher-level health administrators and local 
                                                
36 The Bamako Initiative introduced community participation (and user fees) in the management of primary care 
facilities. It focuses on increasing health workers’ accountability and gives users, through representatives, a say 
in determining part of the health workers’ financial incentives. 24
health service providers.  The fact that Rwanda has a high population density, also in rural 
areas, may be one of the main explanations for the success of the approach. 
Box 8: Community Monitoring
The health committees give these performance bonuses; if someone is absent, the bonus is stopped. Donors also 
give bonuses; if someone comes too late three times in a month, the bonus is stopped.  Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
To find a health worker reading a book when you visit a health centre does not happen anymore. It happened 
before, but now, they fear the health community workers.          User in a rural district 
When a nurse doesn’t interact in the right way with patients, community health counsellors can take action; they 
can decide to fire him.                                                        User in Kigali 
With the decentralisation, the health centre is managed by more than one person, there is a representative of the 
State, but there is also a representative of the population sitting on the health committee. The health committee 
can decide, for example, to pay the rent of a health worker, or to give him a premium, etc... All this is on top of 
the salary. Sometimes, workers with equal qualification do not receive the same bonus. 
Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
The health committees give these performance bonuses; if someone is absent, the bonus is stopped. Donors also 
give bonuses; if someone comes too late three times in a month, the bonus is stopped.  Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
Since community health assistants control the functioning of the health centre, these problems do not exist 
anymore. If a nurse does not behave well towards patients, community health assistants take decisions for this 
nurse. They have the power to hire and fire. This is why the health centres function better today.     User in Kigali 
Today, representatives of the population control the functioning of the health centre; if you’re absent, even an 
ordinary citizen can accuse you by saying for example ‘I’ve seen him in that place and he wasn’t working’. 
When the population has a meeting, the one who has seen you or has had a problem will make it public. 
                               Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
Sometimes the population nominally accuses personnel of the public hospital in the newspapers. 
Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
If the health committee is willing, if you’ve worked well, they can take money out of the financial reserves of the 
health centre and thank you. For example, at the end of each year, I don’t know whether it’s to thank us, they 
take us where we want, we eat, we drink and the health committee pays the bill.           Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
Training 
Health worker norms are often seen as exogenous and difficult to change.  A potential way to 
shift professional norms, however, is through training. Teaching health workers how to 
increase the quality of care and improve their patient management skills can increase 
awareness and improve attitudes, whether the training is general or focuses on specific groups 
of patients, like people living with HIV/AIDS.  The training may also have long term effects, 
as norms tend to be internalized over time, potentially shifting motivation more permanently. 
The government of Rwanda started providing this kind of training and our research suggests 25
that it has been effective.  Health workers argue that it has helped to improve the quality of 
care.  Users draw no causal conclusion, but it is hard to say whether this is because the 
initiative is too recent, because its effects are limited, or because users do not know about the 
training.  Future evaluations may help shed light on this.   
Box 9: Training
Since the training on quality assurance there’s improvement in the attitude of health workers. 
Auxiliary worker in Kigali 
In the past, before the training on HIV, someone who was suspected to be HIV positive was abandoned to 
himself, he was not treated, but that actually does not exist anymore, with the training, we help them, we treat 
them.                        Nurse in a rural district
6. Conclusion
Institutions play a central role for development, but little is known about their role for health 
service delivery.  With the growing consensus is that health worker performance is at the core 
of health care, the question arises how institutions affect health worker behaviour.  However, 
in this new field, there is little insight about what should be the appropriate theoretical 
framework, and, following Mookherjee (2003) we therefore carry out explorative analysis.  
Using qualitative research we hold discussions with health workers and users of health 
services in a country with common health care problems and a dynamic institutional 
environment, Rwanda.  This approach allows us to identify the problems and challenges with 
health worker behaviour and to explore the key institutional factors that help to explain this 
behaviour.   
The problems we identify are very similar to those in other countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, 
and include both issues related to the size and distribution of the workforce, and issues related 
to health workers’ on-the-job performance.  The former include a shortage of health workers 
for specific posts like those in rural areas, in the public sector, and in high HIV/AIDS infected 
areas. Performance problems pointed out as major issues by both health workers and patients 
are the poor attitudes of health workers towards patients, their frequent absenteeism, their 
engagement in corruption and embezzlement, and their lack of medical skills, confirming the 
picture painted by similar research in other countries. 26
Regarding explanatory factors, four institutional factors that affect health worker behaviour 
emerge: extrinsic incentives, monitoring, norms and intrinsic motivation.  On extrinsic 
incentives, our findings underline the need to consider a broader range of incentives, beyond 
the narrow focus of earnings.  But our findings also underline the importance of monitoring, 
or the lack thereof, as well as the key role that norms and intrinsic motivation play.    
So how does this help future research?  What is the appropriate theoretical framework, what 
type of research is needed and what are feasible hypotheses?  Our findings indicate that the 
institutional architecture plays a key role to explain both health workers’ on-the job-
performance and career choice.  It also indicates that, from a research perspective it may be 
best to distinguish and separate career choice from on-the job performance, even though they 
influence each other.  To understand health worker performance the classic principal agent 
model provides a good starting point, but needs to be expanded beyond incentives and 
monitoring to also take norms and intrinsic motivation into account.  To analyse health 
worker career choice, standard models from labour economics provide a starting point, but 
they also need to be extended to allow for a role of work place culture and the type of health 
worker (his or her motivation).  
Although more exploration is warranted in some cases, what is especially needed is 
quantitative research that tests the causality of relationships and their importance more 
formally.    The above mentioned theoretical frameworks will help to formulate testable 
hypotheses regarding the role of each of the four institutional factors.  There is a strong need 
for research on the role of norms and motivation, while the effects of incentives and 
monitoring, although they have received some attention, also warrant more work.  A common 
objection to studying the role of institutions in a quantitative way is that there is often limited 
variation observed.  Our research indicates that this is only true to some extent as incentive 
design, monitoring arrangements, work place culture and the motivation of the health workers 
seem to vary substantially across sectors and between urban and rural areas.  The 
implementation of new initiatives like performance pay or the establishment of community 
health workers may also create further variation.  Furthermore, using more innovative 
techniques may help.  To improve our understanding of the effects of incentives and 
monitoring, the most effective way forward seems to conduct randomized experiments, while 27
to improve our understanding of norms and intrinsic motivation, further exploration by means 
of behavioural games may be a more effective way forward. 
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